The Piper Alpha Cullen Report. The Cause of the Piper Alpha Oil Rig Disaster; Lessons to be Learned and Recommendations; The Cause of the Piper Alpha Oil Rig. Copyright Jim Thomson 2013 Safety In Engineering Ltd 2. In the Piper Alpha Enquiry, Cullen reviewed evidence. Copyright Jim Thomson 2013 Safety In. Piper Alpha (Cullen Report). The human dimension of Piper Alpha always comes first to our minds and remains with us when the precise course of events or the. Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd. The platform began production in 1976, first as an.
Finding Petroleum - Review: Lord Cullen. Monday, September 1. Lord Cullen, who conducted the 1. Piper Alpha disaster, used his keynote speech at the 2.
The judge whose report into the Piper Alpha. Lord Cullen says safety changes 'reduced risk'. Lord Cullen thinks something like Piper Alpha.
- The Piper Alpha platform is the. In November 1990 Lord Cullen's report into the disaster severely criticised safety procedures on the rig owned by Occidental Oil.
- Topic 4: Piper Alpha disaster. If Piper Alpha occurs today all of Lord Cullen’s key recommendations.
- Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmortem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors.
- The Cullen Report—Offshore Safety Case. Originally charged with determining what happened on Piper Alpha, Lord Cullen proactively undertook to develop.
The judge whose report into the Piper Alpha disaster 25 years ago led to huge changes in offshore. Piper Alpha judge Lord Cullen says safety changes.
Oil and Gas UK conference to question how much the industry has learned since then. The inquiry made 1. His talk at the 2. Oil and Gas UK conference to mark 2. Piper Alpha, aimed to 'give you some reflections on the Piper enquiry and look at them in the light of recent developments,' he said.
When starting the Piper Alpha enquiry, it was not obvious what direction it should take, Lord Cullen says: “I was asked to make observations and recommendations with a view to preservation of life and avoiding similar accidents in the future.”There did not seem to be much point in limiting the analysis to the one specific accident, because this would only help prevent that specific accident from re- occurring. Take subsea isolation valves, which were lacking in Piper Alpha.”“But I quickly realised the fundamental, and running through everything else, was the management of safety.”“And as I dug down to the background of what happened, I discovered it was not just a matter of technical or human failure. As is often the case, such failures are indicators of underlying weaknesses in management of safety.”“Management shortcomings emerged in a variety of forms. For example there was no clear procedure for shift handover.
The permit to work system was inadequate. But so far as it went, it had been habitually departed from. Evacuation procedures had not been practised adequately.”“There had not been an adequate assessment of the major hazards and methods for controlling them.”For example, no- one had fully understood the implications of a high pressure gas fire, which would have consequences for the structure and integrity of the platform, for safety of personnel, and for the means of evacuation and escape.
That quality depends critically on effective safe leadership at all levels and the commitment of the whole workforce to give priority to safety.“I saw those factors as intertwined with each other, and together making a positive learning culture and all that entails in the way of values and practises. It is essential to create a corporate atmosphere or culture where safety is understood to be and accepted as the number one priority,” he said.“Management have to communicate this at all times and at all levels within the organisation. Most particularly by their everyday decisions and actions in tacking the issues which arise. They provide the opportunity for subordinates to see real practical substance. Leaders undoubtedly set the tone.”These ideas were echoed by the board which investigated the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew in 2.
If reliability is preached as organisation bumper stickers but leaders constantly emphasis keeping on schedule and saving money, workers will soon realise what is important and change accordingly. Be thorough and inquisitive, avoid leadership by Power.
Point, and question untested assumptions.”Safety means “ensuring all the companies’ employees and contractors not only know how to perform their job safely but are convinced they have responsibility to do so,” Lord Cullen said. Safety representatives. Regulations were introduced in 1. A high level switch for closing down the flow was inoperable. It had not been locked in a working condition. Bunds for containing fuel were inadequately designed and maintained.
A report published in 2. The safety management system focused too closely on personal safety and lacked any real depth on control of major hazards.
There should have been an understanding of major accident risk and systems designed to control them.”Also in 2. BP Texas City Refinery disaster, with a release of flammable liquid and explosion and fire. Cost cutting, failure to invest and production pressures had impaired process safety performance,” he said.“The reliance on a low personal injury rate as a safety indicator had failed to provide a true picture of the health of the safety culture.”“That disaster led to setting up a panel under James Baker III which looked at BP’s US refineries. It said . Among the many words that have been written on this disaster was a report by the Deepwater Horizon Study Group by members of Centre for catastrophic risk management. Findings were strikingly similar.”“It said BP’s system was geared to a . It had been observed that BP forgot to be afraid.”Auditing and Learning.
For a safety system to work, “auditing is essential – and as far I am concerned it should be inquisitive auditing,” he said.“On Piper there had been an audit of the permit to work procedure 6 months before the disaster. No deficiencies had been reported. The management assumed that in the absence of such feedback all was well, but the practise was very different.”Once signs are spotted, you need to make sure people learn from them. After that incident management took some steps but they were not followed through.”“I recall a chief process engineer from Piper saying in the course of his evidence that there were always times when it was a surprise that you found some things were going on.”“In Buncefield there were signs that the equipment was not fit for purpose but nothing was done apart from temporary fixes.”“Warning signs in Texas City refinery had been . It is normal that different workforces have to work together and that they are doing so in isolated and demanding environments.”“The commission which investigated the blowout at the Montara well head platform in the Timor Sea in 2. The rig operators were ultimately responsible for rig safety, but when it came to certain critical procedures it was the owners that were calling the shots.
Rig personnel were oblivious to flawed decisions taken by the owners but were going along with them.”“The commission observed that communications between owners and operators needed to be more formalised with explicit sign- off on importance decisions affecting safety, well integrity and the environment.”“8 months later we come to Macondo again where the National Commission observed . Piper was no exception,” he said.“The Baker Panel said, “BP has the aspirational goal – no accident, no harm to people – but it appears that refinery managers have had no guidance from corporate level refinery management as to how to achieve that goal.”Safety Cases. Lord Cullen spoke at length about safety cases, which is a document, or . This proved to be “a serious setback for development of the offshore regime,” he said.“Onshore the hazards were serious enough. Offshore they were compounded by the isolation of installations, concentration of the workforce on or near them, unpredictability of the weather, and the fact that in the event of an emergency immediately protection for workforce had to be provided. Conduct of one set of employees might affect that of others.”After Piper Alpha, Lord Cullen recommended an offshore safety case regime, which would include identification and control of major hazards, safety management systems, temporary protection for crew in the event of an emergency, and full evacuation and rescue.“I said it was an important component of the regulatory regime.
The safety case should include provision of how safety should be achieved, covering both operators and contractors,” Lord Cullen said.“The requirement for safety cases is no doubt demanding, for operators and for those who have to discharge a regulatory function. It means a thorough assessment of risk, asking and answering the . It was fatally undermined by a flawed assumption. It was seen as one of proving something which everyone knew as a fact, that Nimrod was safe. This attitude was corrosive,” Lord Cullen said.“A company which is competent to operate an offshore installation should be competent to produce a safety case,” Lord Cullen said.“The involvement of the company’s own personnel . It provides a learning opportunity.
It can enable senior management to communicate their safety strategy. It can assist the workforce to understand the rationale for systems and practise.
It should assist in making improvements.”“This pre- supposes that those who should have the information from a safety case can find it and understand it.”“As I understand it, the typical safety case is extensive – and due to the need for it to me technical robust, much of it is complex. That can be a problem.”“The Maitland panel . If that culture is sound and healthy – it should show.”Author: Karl Jeffrey. Company: Digital Energy Journal.